Exchange Rates, Labor Standards, and Democracy: Why China Must Change

For the past five years the global economy has been flying on one engine. That engine is the U.S. consumer who has been on a consumption binge financed by borrowing, in turn backed by a housing price bubble. This situation poses the threat of a serious hard landing when that engine eventually stalls, as it must. Ever inflating house prices and rising debt-to-income levels are not sustainable. And as the late Herbert Stein, Chairman of President Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisers, wryly observed: “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”

This view, regarding the global economy’s excessive dependence on the U.S. and the financial fragility of the U.S. economy, is not just held by progressive economists. It is also shared by Wall Street. Thus, Stephen Roach, Chief Economist for Morgan Stanley, recently wrote in the Financial Times (November 4, 2005): “there is now about a forty percent probability of a hard landing in the next twelve months.” And in a research brief, Roach singles out China as being particularly dependent on the U.S.: “China’s export prowess is balanced on the head of a pin – a pin made in America. Fully thirty-five percent of Chinese exports go to the United States.”

Roach’s Wall Street warnings are sobering. But they miss a more profound point, which is that the global economy has been heading in the wrong direction, hollowing out the middle class in America while failing to create a big enough middle class in the developing world. That hollowing-out process has long been visible in U.S. statistics on wages and family income distribution, and it has been rendered keenly concrete by Delphi Corp.’s recent bankruptcy filing. It is only because of successive stock market and housing price bubbles, combined with a massive increase in consumer access to credit, that the hollowing-out has not been worse.

A major cause of these dangerous trends is the flawed structure of the global economy. Spurred by our own policy makers, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, developing countries have adopted an export-led approach to manufacturing growth and development. This approach has two critical features. First, countries rely on selling in foreign markets rather than their own domestic markets. Second, countries use under-valued exchange rates to subsidize their products, thereby making them hyper-competitive. China exemplifies this model, exporting over half of its manufacturing output and having an exchange rate that is up to forty percent undervalued.

The focus on export-led growth has distorted the global economy. First, it has created the global financial imbalances that Wall Street is so apprehensive about, as manifested in the record U.S. trade deficit. Second, U.S. manufacturing has been undermined by unfair competition subsidized by under-valued currencies. This in turn has accelerated the hollowing of America’s middle. Third, export-led growth promotes the global race-to-the-bottom since countries look for international competitive advantage however possible. Consequently, workplace standards, wages, and the environment are all subject to persistent retrograde pressures, impeding the development of a middle class in developing countries.

The implication is that the global economy must shift from export-led development to domestic market-led development. In an export-led world, higher wages undermine employment. In a domestic market-led world, higher wages can promote employment. This is where labor standards and unions enter. The challenge is to establish a system that has wages rising with productivity so that workers can buy what they produce, rather than dumping it on world markets. Setting wages by government edict does not work, as evidenced by the former socialist economies. Instead, labor standards and unions are the way forward, since they provide a decentralized mechanism that links wages and productivity through bargaining. History supports this. Every country that has ever made the transition to developed industrialized status has traveled this route.

China is the poster-child for export-led manufacturing growth. It has the most under-valued exchange rate, the worst labor repression, and is by far the largest developing country exporter. As such, China is the gravitational attractor for the race to the bottom. Other countries must change too, but they can only do so if China changes so that none lose relative competitive advantage. If China revalues its exchange rate, other East Asian countries can also do so. Likewise, if China raises wages, so too can others.

One area where China is showing leadership is its stated commitment to increase social spending. This will be good for China’s citizenry, and it will also contribute to incomes and domestic demand in China which will be good for the global economy. However, there is also a problem that is unique to China. Labor standards and trade unions are key to domestic market-led development, but China’s political system prevents them. That creates an additional political roadblock that must be solved. Democratic reform in China is not a nicety. It is a necessity for the global economy to work.

6 Responses to “Exchange Rates, Labor Standards, and Democracy: Why China Must Change”

  1. China Is Either Part of the Problem Or Solution

    In part, hope for the world’s worker is dependent upon the actions of the Chinese government. As Thomas Palley puts it, the global economy is now driven by exports. Wages and prices worldwide are in a “race for the bottom” where workers will be even…

  2. Robert LaJeunesse says:

    Kudus again Tom on a very lucid description. But the question remains of how to get china to change? Do we resort to traditional trade policy (i.e. tariffs and quotas), diplomacy or international labor solidarity?

  3. Mark Setterfield says:

    Some of you may find the recent proposals made by Wynne Godley and his colleagues at the Levy Institute interesting in this regard. Economists have long understood that a simultaneous tariff and subsidy policy is equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation, in which case the US could be the first mover rather than waiting for China et al to revalue their currencies (which is what Godley et al are now proposing). The only glitch is the potential for retaliation in kind. But would a threat on the part of the US to take more drastic measures to close off its domestic markets (eg, revoking China’s most favoured nation trading status) suffice to head off such threats?

  4. globalization watch: race to the bottom edition

    globalization is an issue that interests me a lot, and there has been a good amount of excellent discussion a few weekends ago on the topic, covering a lot of ground.
    Barkley Rosser and Thomas Palley, two economists far smarter and definitely way more…

  5. John Bohn says:

    Following up on Mark Setterfield’s comment, Article XII of the GATT still allows WTO members to impose special tariffs to preserve their balance of payments. President Nixon did this in 1971. Has any consideration been given to that lately? Obviously it would have many problems, and tariffs would have to apply equally to all imports from all nations (except perhaps LDCs), but a modest 5%-10% tariff would seem equivalent to a currency devaluation of the same magnitude, and perhaps at least put a dent in the budget or trade deficits.

  6. Winslow R. says:

    “That creates an additional political roadblock that must be solved. Democratic reform in China is not a nicety. It is a necessity for the global economy to work.”

    I agree than Democratic reform in China would be nice and could work, but is not necessarily required. While it is true China’s dictatorship has no estabilished way to transfer power if it becomes unpopular, it has shown an ability to remain in charge while bettering the standing of its people.

    Domestic demand led growth requires a stable source of basic commodities especially in a dictatorship. If domestic demand is cut off due to instabilities in basic commodities, the governing power will become unpopular and be overthrown through violent means if there is no orderly means to transfer power.

    China, to maintain stability, will limit growth in domestic demand to growth in basic commodity supply and avoid the ‘need’ for Democracy. What is needed for global trade to work is a stable supply of basic commodities.

    I guess the question is which would be harder to achieve in China, Democracy or a stable commodity supply?